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Constructing crime, enacting morality: emotion, crime and anti-social behaviour 
in an inner-city community 
 
Abstract 
Research into emotion, crime and anti-social behaviour has lacked psychological 
input and rarely considered the multi-directional associations between emotion, crime 
and morality. We present a study analysing audio recordings of two community 
groups meeting in a deprived inner city area with high rates of crime, using 
conversation analytic and discursive psychological techniques to conduct an affective-
textual analysis that draws out aspects of participants’ moral reasoning and identifies 
its emotional dimensions. Moral reasoning around crime and ASB took three forms 
(invoking moral categories, developing moral hierarchies, invoking vulnerable 
others), and was bound up with a wide range of emotional enactments and emotion 
displays. Findings are discussed in relation to contemporary government policy and 
possible future research. 
 
Introduction 
Across the social sciences and humanities, there has recently been what is being 
called an affective turn: a resurgent interest in emotion, feeling and affect, understood 
as hybrid, embodied phenomena neither simply biological nor wholly reducible to 
social influence (Athanasiou, Hantzaroula, & Yannakopoulos, 2008; Blackman & 
Cromby, 2007; Clough & Halley, 2007). Within criminology, De Haan & Loader 
(2002) described the discipline as facing a new ‘aetiological crisis’ that might best be 
resolved by taking account of the affective dimensions of criminal behaviour, in order 
to better comprehend the motives of offenders. They argue that there are both 
historical and intuitive, normative links between emotion, crime and social control; 
that current Anglo-American discourse on crime bears an increasingly heightened 
emotional tone, and that emotion is ‘inescapably implicated’ in late modern penality. 
Karstedt (2002) makes the related argument that in recent years there has been a 
widespread ‘emotionalisation’ of law and justice. On the one hand contemporary 
emphases on individuality and autonomy have led to greater value being placed on 
‘authentic’ emotion displays; on the other, global media increasingly promulgate 
emotionalised practices of compassion, sympathy, sorrow and rage that position 
audiences as moral spectators of distant suffering. Karstedt argues that penal law and 
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criminal justice systems have responded to these societal changes with a 
‘rediscovered’ moral imagination that especially emphasises shame and orients 
toward public and collective emotion displays. In the same vein, Yar (2009) questions 
criminology’s partitioning of reason and emotion, arguing that it has produced an 
over-reliance on notions of rational actors that has blinded analysts to the 
reasonability of emotion. Nevertheless, recent criminological engagement with 
emotion has been largely restricted to studies of the sensuous thrills and illicit 
passions of offending (Ferrell, 2003; Katz, 1998, 1999), analyses of the emotional 
dimensions of criminal justice and restitution (Karstedt, 2002; Scheff & Retzinger, 
1991; van Stokkom, 2002), and research within the ‘fear of crime’ paradigm. 
 
Another way in which criminological research on emotion may appear relatively 
restricted is with respect to its disciplinary origins. The vast majority has been 
conducted by criminologists, geographers and sociologists, and despite the seemingly 
obvious relevance of their disciplinary expertise there has been relatively little input 
from psychologists. Katz’s work is informed by social psychology and there has been 
a strand of psychologically-informed work using a psychoanalytic frame to explore 
the ways in which fear and anxiety about crime appear as defensive and defended 
responses within the context of individual biographies (Gadd & Jefferson, 2007; 
Hollway & Jefferson, 1997); within criminology there have also been calls to deploy 
psychological definitions of emotion and notions of appraisal and cognition (Jackson, 
2006). But other relevant psychological perspectives have had little impact: for 
example, work on the neuroscience and experimental psychology of emotion, social 
and cultural psychological studies of emotion discourse, and discursive psychological 
and conversation analytic approaches, have not significantly informed criminology. 
 
One possible consequence of this relatively narrow focus is that it seems to have 
largely precluded empirical consideration of the everyday associations between crime 
and anti-social behaviour (hereafter, ASB), emotion and morality. Such work seems 
timely within an emotionalised legal and juridical climate, and might illuminate the 
moral character of recent and current government initiatives. ASB became a 
prominent object of public concern and government policy during the 1990’s, 
especially under the 1997 New Labour administration; however, its roots lay in earlier 
Conservative policy, and its continuing significance has been noted under Cameron’s 
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Conservative leadership (Millie, 2009). Despite its high profile, ASB remains a 
contested concept: its emphasis on the subjective possibilities for harassment and 
distress blurs and extends the boundaries of criminality, whilst its enforcement – 
primarily through anti-social behaviour orders or ASBO’s - disproportionately 
impacts those who are already marginalised and dispossessed (BIBIC, 2005; Fyson & 
Yates, in press; Nixon, Hodge, Parr, Willis, & Hunter, 2008). Crawford (2009) asserts 
that the ASB agenda is preoccupied with the question of governing young people, and 
that it challenges traditional conceptions of criminal justice through an increased 
emphasis on the quasi-informal regulation of individual behaviour. 
 
Discussions of ASB frequently mobilise notions of ‘respect’, notably within the well-
publicised ‘Respect’ agenda (Home Office, 2006b). Like the ASBO, this agenda 
addressed various issues: begging, noise, street-drinking, drugs, prostitution and fly-
tipping were included, but so were high hedges, graffiti, parenting and noisy smokers 
outside pubs (Home Office, 2009). Whilst respect has been less prominent within 
national policy in recent years, it continues to inform local initiatives: in Nottingham, 
where the empirical research reported here was conducted, a 2003 initiative “Respect 
for Nottingham” is now a high-profile “city-wide partnership committed to tackle low 
level crime and anti-social behaviour”, with an action plan stretching until 2012 
which explicitly promotes ‘respect and consideration’ (Nottingham Crime and Drugs 
Partnership, 2007). But respect, too, is controversial as a medium for and target of 
policy: as a prominent element of what Sayer (2005) calls ‘lay morality’, respect is 
normative, and yet cannot be imposed from above (Sennett, 2003); attempts to do so 
may actually reinforce social exclusion by falsely rendering the standards of dominant 
groups as an ostensibly neutral ‘civility’ (Sen, 2007). By emphasising that respect 
‘cannot be learned, purchased or acquired, it can only be earned’ (Home Office, 
2006b), policy devalues those who have not managed to ‘earn’ the respect of others, 
elides the responsibility of government to foster mutual respect between individuals 
and institutions, and ignores how individuals and institutions with power and status 
may themselves be disrespectful (Harris, 2006). Respect fundamentally requires 
mutuality and equality, but policy initiatives on ‘respect’ have not addressed 
inequality, and ignore the basic inequality between government and its citizens 
(Somerville, 2009). 
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Moreover, independently of this policy context there is good interdisciplinary 
evidence for multi-directional links between crime and ASB, morality, and emotion. 
First, crime and morality are interwoven, but not equivalent: although crime is defined 
by legal codes that often echo moral injunctions, morality does not always coincide 
with legality. The relations between legality and morality are often most visibly 
contested with respect to issues such as abortion (Strettton, 2006), euthanasia (Atari, 
2008) and homosexuality (Greenberg & Bailey, 1993), although in everyday life they 
frequently appear in more mundane ways. Karstedt & Farrall (2006) discuss various 
‘everyday’ crimes on the fringes of both legality and morality, such as jumping red 
traffic lights, inflating insurance claims, or misrepresenting one’s home address to 
gain a place at a favoured school. They show how the prevalence of such practices is 
normatively bound up with moral economies (particular configurations of justice 
perceptions, regulatory regimes, profits and entitlements, and behavioural and role 
expectations), and provide evidence suggesting that these moral economies are 
influenced by wider economic and social conditions. When we broaden our focus to 
include ASB, the fit with morality becomes even more complex: although the 1998 
Crime and Disorder Act defined ASB relatively clearly as “acting in a manner that 
caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not 
of the same household as the complainant”, in practice ASB is a hugely elastic 
concept (Scraton, 2004). Millie (2008) argues that not only are judgements about ASB 
informed by the behavioural expectations associated with places, events and 
situations, but also that other considerations, particularly the aesthetic, often come 
into play. Relatedly, qualitative studies of everyday incivilities provide evidence that 
people frequently take moral stances toward behaviours that are not necessarily 
illegal, but which are considered inappropriate or threatening (Phillips & Smith, 
2003).  
 
Emotion and morality are also closely linked. Historically, moral philosophers 
frequently held that emotions were irrational, biasing influences upon the rational 
application of proper moral judgement, but in recent years this view has changed and 
emotions are now widely seen as making both communicative and informational 
contributions to moral judgements (Ben-Ze-ev, 1997). Moreover, contemporary 
neuroscience and psychology furnish extensive evidence of links between morality 
and emotion. The recent discovery of mirror neurons (Gallese & Goldman, 1998) – 
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neurons that fire when expressions and actions are performed, and when the same 
expressions or actions are observed – has led to the suggestion that these neurons are 
the organic basis of empathy, an emotion usually seen as a key component of moral 
reasoning (Haidt, 2003). Whatever the eventual status of this strong claim, numerous 
brain imaging and neuro-anatomical studies also suggest that emotions and feelings of 
various kinds contribute significantly to everyday moral reasoning (Imordino-Yang & 
Damasio, 2007). A recent review of experimental psychological evidence similarly 
found good evidence for the involvement of guilt, shame and empathy in moral 
judgement, and less extensive evidence that other emotions (happiness, sadness, 
anger) also contribute (Eisenberg, 2000). In recent years, the ways that children 
acquire the ability to make moral judgements alongside their growing ability to 
differentiate and regulate emotion have also been extensively studied (Barrett, Zahn-
Waxler, & Cole, 1993). Similarly, discursive psychological studies of everyday 
reasoning and decision-making show that emotions and emotion displays get regularly 
invoked as people negotiate their moral worlds (e.g. Edwards, 1999; Locke & 
Edwards, 2003; Stokoe & Edwards, 2007; Tileaga, 2007). 
 
Finally, the fear of crime paradigm provides extensive empirical evidence that crime 
and ASB engender emotion. Whilst levels of reported fear in the UK have declined 
since the 1980’s, recent surveys still reveal significant levels of concern. The majority 
of earlier surveys deployed some variant of the so-called ‘standard question’: “how 
safe would you feel walking alone in your neighbourhood at night?” (Hale, 1996). 
More recent research probing actual rather than hypothetical fear (e.g. “have you 
worried about x in the past 12 months? How many times have you worried about x in 
the last 12 months”) not only finds lower levels of fear, but also that fears may act as 
‘barometers’ for perceptions of social cohesion and moral consensus (Gray, Jackson, 
& Farrall, 2008). In recent years, qualitative studies have become increasingly 
common, and have similarly provided evidence suggesting that surveys may over-
estimate actual levels of fear. Qualitative studies further suggest that emotional 
responses to crime are variable, transitory and situational (Pain, 1997, 2000), may 
arise differently for parents (Tulloch, 2004), children (Nayak, 2003) older people 
(Tulloch, 2000) and ethnic minorities (Chakraborti & Garland, 2003), and follow the 
contours of local ‘social geographies’ that inform participants’ understandings. 
Qualitative studies also show that other emotions than fear are prompted by crime and 
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that different emotions arise according to whether crime is experienced directly, 
witnessed, or simply contemplated (Phillips & Smith, 2003). 
 
So it seems that there are complex, multi-directional associations between crime and 
ASB, emotion and morality, and that research exploring the dense nexus of their 
intersection might be valuable. Smith (1999) highlights the central role of 
communities in locating and promulgating moralities. Communal ties provide the oft-
unrecognised ‘structures of feeling’ (Taylor, Evans, & Fraser, 1996) or background 
assumptions (Benson, 2001; Shotter, 1993a, 1993b) against which moral judgements 
are actually made; these judgements always arise within a web of debts, inheritances, 
expectations and obligations (MacIntyre, 1985). Consequently, moralities are already 
thoroughly bound up with social relations, such that everyday social interaction is an 
appropriate site for discursive psychological studies of their operation (Stokoe & 
Wallwork, 2003). Moralities are frequently contested and contradictory, and their 
heterogeneity can be related to conflicting moral philosophies and the notions of 
‘community’ they rely upon. Smith (1999) notes the different concepts of community 
deployed in liberalism and communitarianism. Liberalism frequently represents 
community as a freely-chosen adjunct to the activities of a rational individual, and so 
with respect to morality is arguably too individualistic, a-historical, insensitive to the 
material sources of selfhood, and overly concerned with rights rather than 
relationships. Communitarianism is said to overcome these difficulties by 
conceptualising selves as relational, located within ‘constitutive communities’ that 
provide communal bonds and socio-spatial hierarchies of duties and responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, its claimed advantages are themselves contested on the grounds that it 
harkens back to an idealised past, fosters protectionism, is intolerant of diversity, 
downplays the significance of gendered power relations, and does not take adequate 
account of material differences in power and wealth. 
 
Clearly, therefore, community cannot simply be an abstract ‘warm fuzzy’, 
automatically preferable to the anomie of wider society (Sayer & Storpor, 1997); its 
associations with morality call for empirical investigation. Communities can be 
defined in terms of common needs and goals, a sense of the common good, shared 
lives, culture and views of the world, and shared or collective action (Silk, 1999). 
Some communities have a clear territorial basis and can be defined in terms of 
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bounded geographical space, whereas others are more ‘stretched out’ and spatially 
dispersed, their social relations mediated by communication technologies and not 
isomorphic with any given spatial form (Allen & Hamnett, 1995; Miller, 1993). The 
‘imagined communities’ of nationhood (Anderson, 1991) contain elements of both in 
that they associate geographical location with comradeship and belonging to others, 
most of whom will never be met, but whose presence gets actualised in mediated 
symbolic relations enacted with relation to phenomena such as language, religion, 
dress, cuisine, and worked up in ritual, ceremony, and the assertion of ‘tradition’ 
(Cohen, 1985; Johnson, 1995). 
 
The present study explores the intersections between emotion, morality, crime and 
ASB by analysing audio recordings of the meetings of two community groups. Whilst 
both groups are constituted geographically with respect to a fairly small, clearly 
defined inner-city area, they are also predicated on the notion that their actions should 
be in the best interests of all local residents within that area, to this extent the 
community they embody is also a symbolic one. The data are naturalistic, based upon 
recordings of meetings that would have occurred anyway; there are various reasons 
why this kind of data is particularly suited to an investigation of the nexus of 
associations between morality, emotion, crime and ASB. Because the data were not 
produced with respect to the kinds of formal social science research agendas, 
categories and interests that frequently ‘saturate’ interview data (Potter & Hepburn, 
2005), the incidents of crime and ASB were those spontaneously produced by the 
participants: consequently, definitions of crime and ASB are those made by 
participants, rather than those of researchers. Similarly, the emotional responses and 
moral stances associated with these incidents of crime and ASB were similarly 
unconstrained as participants reacted entirely freely to each other in the course of 
meetings. Moreover, the data contain unregulated sequences of group interaction 
where constructions of crime and ASB coincide both with enactments of emotion and 
with moral stances; it is within such sequences or ‘situated lines of action’ that the 
import of emotions, as forms of social action, becomes most readily apparent 
(Ginsburg & Harrington, 1996; Goodwin & Goodwin, 2000). 
 
Method 
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Data consist of audio recordings of meetings of two community groups, made 
between June 2006 and May 2009 in a deprived area of Nottingham UK, a city 
notable in recent years for its high crime rates - especially gun crime. City-level 
statistics may overstate Nottingham’s problems: its strikingly high per capita crime 
rates are partly an artefact of the particular way local authority boundaries are drawn. 
Nevertheless, although recorded crime fell during the study period, the inner-city area 
where the groups meet was consistently characterised by high crime rates: for 
example, in 2005 there were 61.7 recorded offences per thousand people, compared to 
a national average of 25.5 (Home Office, 2006a): this rose to 69 by 2008, then fell to 
51 in 2009 (Nottinghamshire Police, 2010). The area is ethnically diverse, with 
significant levels of income deprivation, unemployment, poor health, disability and 
pensioner poverty (Nottingham City Council, 2004; Nottingham Crime and Drugs 
Partnership, 2009). 
 
Both groups are supported by a charity that forges links between business, local 
government and community to regenerate the area. The ‘Tidy Our Community’ 
(TOC) group manages limited resources in an effort to make the local environment 
cleaner and friendlier; the ‘Watch Our Community’ (WOC) group works with 
community representatives and institutions to monitor and improve community safety. 
Issues relevant to crime and ASB were recurrent topics of conversation in both: the 
WOC group take crime and ASB as their explicit focus, whilst the (controversial) 
‘broken windows’ theory that neighbourhood disorder and disarray cause criminal 
activity  (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) explicitly links the work of the TOC group to 
crime and ASB (Nottingham Crime and Drugs Partnership, 2009). 
 
There was considerable overlap between membership of the groups, with both 
consisting of largely the same core of local residents: it was not possible to 
systematically gather demographic information, but these people tended to be equally 
likely to be female or male, older (many were in their 40’s, the oldest in his 70’s), 
predominantly Caucasian, and resident in the area for some considerable time. 
Membership was quite stable, although the number of local residents present at each 
meeting varied between five and twelve. Meetings also include representatives of 
other institutions and community bodies: a church, a drop-in centre, other local 
charities, community wardens, Community Protection Officers and Police 
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Community Support Officers. On occasion, representatives of other groups and 
institutions (the City Council, the University) were invited to attend. All meetings 
were facilitated by a paid worker. 
 
Informed consent was separately given by each participant; if anyone withheld 
consent, the meeting was not recorded. Eighteen meetings were recorded (thirteen 
TOC, five WOC), generating twenty-four hours of data. Recordings were first 
transcribed for content by a professional transcription service; subsequently, selected 
sections were re-transcribed following the conventions described in Jefferson (1985). 
Data were then subjected to an affective-textual analysis using techniques drawn from 
conversation and discourse analysis. Wiggins & Potter (2008) note that embodied 
responses are often bound up with spoken interaction and can be analysed using 
discursive techniques, and Goodwin & Goodwin (2000) show how the rapidity of 
turn-taking and shifts in pitch, volume and speed are discursive traces of affective 
force and embodied emotionality, interpretable within the action sequences where 
they occur. Similarly, Stokoe & Wallwork (2003) show how conversation and 
discourse analyses can be used to explore the workings of a moral order, through 
focusing on participants’ constructions of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ others, and by exploring 
how the categories participants deploy “align and re-align the social and moral order 
and establish some version of events as social ‘fact’ .. or as constituting common 
knowledge about what defines appropriate and moral behaviours” (p.556). Thus, the 
meetings were a suitable site for the exploration of moral activity, and detailed 
examination of the rhythms, prosody and turn-by-turn organisation of their talk might 
render its emotional aspects tractable. 
 
Analysis 
 
As might be expected in this task-oriented setting, levels of overt emotion are 
relatively low across the data corpus; only laughter and amusement are frequently 
overtly enacted, although utterances were frequently imbued with varying degrees of 
affective force or determination. An analysis detailing the variety and character of 
emotions enacted in relation to crime and ASB nevertheless identified five major 
emotion clusters in the data: nervousness and not feeling safe, humour and 
amusement, anger and indignation, irritation and frustration, and resignation 
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(Cromby, Brown, Gross, Locke, & Pattterson, 2009). The analysis below is organised 
into three sections: first we examine how moral categories such as responsibility, 
consideration and respect are worked up and applied by participants; second, we show 
how participants develop moral hierarchies by constructing ‘good’ and ‘bad’ versions 
of people and groups; and third, we illustrate some of the ways in which moral 
judgements are enacted by invoking the particular needs of specific groups of people. 
In all three sections, we consider the extent and the manner in which affective force 
and emotional enactment contribute to the participant’s activities of moral reasoning. 
 
Moral categories 
At various points in the data, participants explicitly invoke moral categories such as 
responsibility, consideration and respect. In the first two extracts, participants work up 
responsibility and a ‘duty of care’ with regard to two large companies: an ASDA 
supermarket where a new covered walkway may invite street drinkers to congregate, 
and a transport company (‘LOT’): 
 
Extract 1: WOC1
Mik: >it would be useful< if that (.) did start happening, to put it 1 
firmly in ASDA’s court and say: 2 
3  (0.4) 
Pau: mmn you’ve [ma]de thi:s,  4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Mik:            [y-]           
Pau: an no[w you  
Mik:      [you doing it, you’[ve created a problem,=  
Pau:                         [(oh (.)  yeah ) 
Mik: =9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
now sort[it ou:t. 
Pau:          [◦(you)◦ created it. 
 (0.4) 
?  : [(        )] 
Mik: [>a bit lik-<] >a bit like< uh:m when we were talking about the 
auto crime on the ((name)) Park and Ride, 
 (0.9) 
Mik: uh when i was talking to uh police about that and (>w’ended 
up<) saying about putting extra 
16 
resources in. uh (0.7) please (0.2) 
.h why not not contact ↑LOt,  
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
 ((murmurs of agreement)) 
Mik: ↑Lot have the responsibility for the car park, 
?  : ◦yeah◦ 
Mik: they’re benefiting from the people going in there  
 ‘c[os they're 
?  :   [yeah. 
Mik: using [the trams. 
?  :       [yeah I know. 
Mik: so place it firmly in ↑their court.  27 
28 
29 
30 
?  : ◦mmn◦ 
Mik: ↑YOu supply security, (.) rather than the police and  
 >◦they [pay for it.◦<  ] 
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Way:        [WEll that’s it,] >i mean< the police aren’t a private 
security::. [ Paul   
31 
32 
33 
34 
(.) 
?  :                 [◦exactly◦ 
Way: they shouldn’t do it. it's their responsible so:: 
 
As the extract begins, Mike and Paul are jointly constructing the problem caused by 
ASDA, giving their concern immediacy and moral force by using active voicing 
(Wooffitt, 1992). In their talk it is as if they could somehow speak directly to the 
supermarket, as though it were a person with moral obligations like anyone else. At 
line 14, Mike then links this problem with ASDA to one previously discussed with 
regard to the transport company, LOT, noting similarities between them. As the talk 
progresses it is clear that the equivalence here is as much moral as practical, since in 
each case the company concerned is being held responsible for a problem caused by 
their ordinary activities. Throughout, affective force is enacted by repeated patterns of 
emphases (e.g.: ‘you’ve made this’; ‘now sort it out’), whilst the frequent turn-taking 
with occasional overlaps and completions suggests something of the intensity of the 
group’s joint engagement, an interpretation further supported by the presence of 
background vocalisations concurring with the main speakers (line 19). Whilst 
responsibility is explicitly invoked only twice, by Mike (line 20) and Wayne (line 34), 
in the next extract it becomes explicitly clear that equivalent moral responsibility is 
being imputed to both ASDA and LOT: ‘responsibility’ is further ratcheted up to 
‘duty of care’, a phrase invoking not just morality but legality; and at lines 5-7 Paul 
neatly summarises how this moral obligation falls equally on both companies, a 
judgement with which Mike concurs: 
 
Extract 2: WOC11
Pau: yeah, each business should have a duty o[f care,  1 
2 May:                                         [(◦     ◦) 
Pau: so Asda [should have a  3 
May:         [well we do:, 4 
5 Pau: >duty of care< ter: (.) stop the drinkers congregating under 
 thee:, (0.7) walkways and uhm ↑LOT should have a >duty of care< 
 of looking after its:, (0.4) ↑
6 
customers ↑cars. 7 
Mik: ◦i agree.◦ 
 
Moral categories of consideration and respect are also sometimes invoked; in extract 3 
we see both of these deployed in relation to ASB by students coming home late at 
night and making unwarranted noise: 
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Extract 3: TOC6
Ste:  they come back from town about two three in the  1 
2 
3 
 morning.=they make so much noise and the local residents think  
 (0.5) you’re only here for a year or some’at an y- y- you’re makin 
our life a misery. 4 
Leo:  mm::, on th- >on the other hand,< tha- that- that is what students 
at that a:ge.  
5 
6 do  
Ste: °yea:h°= 7 
Leo: =>i mean the-< (0.7) I’M SUre I di:d a- a:n:d°uh°(0.3)perhaps-= 
 perhaps the uh- we uh all did at 
8 
one point. uhm (0.6) so >perhaps 
 there’s a need< fo:r slightly greater: understanding 
9 
there: on: 
 
10 
both  sides. 11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
 
Ste:  thats right yeah. 
(0.4) 
Leo:  mm::. 
 
Mik:  can i- (0.2) can i a[sk w- 
(0.5)  
? :                 [(no l-         [   )  
Jun:        [don’t know about that] 18 
19 Bar:                                      [  I: Do:n’t agr:     ]ee: 
UNderstanding [on both [si:des? 20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
? :                 [(       [    )   
? :                          [(no:r:) 
 (0.4) 
? :   [(             ) 
Bar:   [(             )   
 (0.2) 
Bar: bloody makin a racket in a- an that t↓ime of the  27 
28 
29 
 ↓morning=  
? : °mm:° 
Bar: its- its not ON. 30 
31 
32 
33 
 
Leo:  mm:: I:: agree it’s not on, 
(0.2) 
? : (well its not [jus  ) 
Bar:                [it ain: on. they want TElling abou:t it 34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
                    [((several other turns going on at once))  
Leo:  yea:h,  
 
Leo: ye::[s= 
(0.3) 
     [((remnants of other conversation in background))            
Leo:               [On:: the other hand, we:: ought to understand th- 
the-= 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Ste:  =>no offence against students by the way.< 
Leo:          [they don’t-  
              [((general laughter [laughter continues in background)) 
Leo:                             [they don’t int↓end to  45 
46  (>        <)=at that age (0.4) i:: quite  
47 
48 
49 
50 
  often think that they- that they don’t think about that you 
know, 
 (0.5) 
Leo:  an:[d: i:::] 
 
Bar:     [but(.)i]ts called having consideration for othe[rs 51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
? :                                                     [its called     
r[es[pect  
Leo:   [(i::- 
? :  [((several voices - mixed talk and laughter))           
Bar:  [i- i mean they’re only in transit ↓anyway: until  56 
57 
58 
59 
 they:[ve, finish:ed ] 
? :      [(            )] 
Bar: university.= 
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Leo:  =i::: (agree with you there) 60 
61  ((
Bar:  ↑
other talk in background))  
EXactl↑Y, 
The extract begins with Steve’s description of the problem, a description already 
tailored to invoke a moral stance. Simply returning from town at an unsociable hour is 
unremarkable, but its formulation both as a continuous, pervasive problem (seemingly 
always ‘about two or three in the morning’) and as involving a quantity (‘so much’) of 
noise helps manage it as a ‘reasonable’ complaint. Moreover, the complaint is not 
Steve’s, but is expressed in terms of local residents’ ‘thoughts’. This ‘footing’ 
(Goffman, 1979) has the dual effect of generalising the issue as one affecting 
numerous others, whilst also effacing any apparent personal stake that Steve may 
have in raising it (Potter, 1996) In these ways, the student’s behaviour gets 
constructed as anti-social, so causing ‘our’ lives to become ‘a misery’. 
 
An alternate judgement of the students’ behaviour is then offered by Leo (line 5-6), 
accompanied by an attempt to reformulate the issue as one of mutual consideration 
and understanding (lines 8-11). This produces some disagreement amongst the group, 
and in response to further attempts to construct the problem as mutual, Barry first 
restates Leo’s position ( a need for “understanding there on both sides”), but using a 
questioning intonation to produce it as something that is incredulous. Then, on lines 
27-28), he reformulates Steve’s original complaint into a much stronger version, using 
an if-then formulation which suggests that an alternative perspective (and attendant 
actions) might be emerging. Steve’s reference to noise is ratcheted up to “bloody 
making a racket” (line 27) and the unsociability of it occurring in the early hours is 
reiterated (‘that time of the morning’). Repeated emphases add affective force and 
help reinforce the ‘then’ aspect of the if-then formulation (‘it’s not on’: line 30), 
leading to his suggested action, which again is affectively loaded using emphases 
(line 34: ‘they want TElling abou:t it’). So: (IF they’re) bloody making a racket 
(THEN) it’s not on, they want telling about it”, a formulation clearly hearable as 
anger or indignation. 
 
Despite the affective force of Barry’s turn, Leo continues to pursue a more tolerant 
stance by offering an explanation for the student’s ASB based upon their immaturity 
(line 42). The overall emotional tone remains mostly good-humoured (line 44), but 
disagreement continues and Barry introduces notions of ‘consideration’ and ‘respect’. 
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The phrase ‘its called having consideration for others’ (line 51) indexes consideration 
as something ‘out there’, objectively available for all to recognise; his next turn uses 
the same formulation, but this time citing ‘respect’ as the objectively recognisable 
moral category. Together, these lines construct consideration and respect as readily-
visible elements of a generally accepted moral code, which the students’ ASB is 
breaching. He completes his argument by addressing the temporal dimension of the 
problem (first visible in Steve’s initial turn), noting that students are ‘only in transit 
anyway’: line 56). The emphatic loading of this turn, together with its position at the 
end of a sequence building a moral judgement, thus reinforces the judgement by 
suggesting that students should perhaps be more considerate and more respectful, 
precisely because they are not permanent residents. 
 
Moral hierarchies 
In this section we show how the participants work up neighbourhood problems into 
moral issues by making contrasts between good and bad groups, kinds of individuals, 
and behaviours. In extract 4 they are discussing cycling on the pavement: 
 
Extract 4:TOC2
Joy:   [(mm) the thing is that: its not >so much people who’re< 
cycling]         
1 
2 
3 
4 
 with care, it’s people who belt past= 
?  : =◦mm[ yeh◦ 
Joy:     [i mean i do- you do see people cycling with care. =they’re 
going slow, they’re 
5 
awa:re  6 
7 
8 
 
Way: [◦yes◦  
[of pedestrians, 
Joy:     [they’re awa:re of other things. 9 
10 
11 
Way:      [yeah 
And : [◦thats the thing (        )◦] 
Way: [i mean i’m sure if i were a ]cyclist i.h (.)#would never dare 
go on the roads#, but it’s those who 
12 
whiz past, don’t: care, turn 
round corners. th- °you 
13 
know, th’t° are causing the problems for 
those who (.) 
14 
are more careful. 15 
 
Here we see Joy constructing two differing ‘types’ of cyclist; those “cycling with 
care” and those who “don’t care”. These are not just opposites, they are also 
differently formulated: whereas ‘cycling’ can be done with or without care, saying 
that some cyclists ‘don’t care’ is to attribute their actions to a personal disposition of 
showing disregard for others, so favouring a moral assessment rather than a simple 
description. The participants use two three-part lists to contrast the careful cyclist with 
the cyclists who don’t care: careful cyclists go slow, are aware of pedestrians and 
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aware of other things (lines 5-7); careless cyclists whiz past, don’t care and turn round 
corners - presumably without knowing what is around them (lines 13-14) . Atkinson 
(1984) showed that three-part lists are potent rhetorical devices that tend to elicit 
powerful, emotion-laden agreement; he also found that contrasts, too, recruit emotive 
responses. Hence it is notable that ‘slow’ cycling is not contrasted with a reciprocal 
level of speed (fast) but with metaphorical expressions (flying, whizzing, belting past) 
that further upgrade the ‘bad’ behaviour of the ‘non-caring’ cyclists. The contrasts are 
given further affective force both by (some) repeated emphases, and by a prosodic 
difference: compared to the talk about bad cyclists, the talk describing good cyclists is 
noticeably slower, with relatively elongated vowel sounds: here, the character of the 
talk itself hearably invokes the more measured and careful style of cycling that is 
favoured. Thus, a combination of emotive rhetorical devices and affective enactments 
are combined to work up a moral judgement about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cyclists. 
 
Similar strategies are also deployed elsewhere; one lengthy conversation discusses a 
local park where two contrasting groups of users are identified: ‘fire-jugglers’ and 
‘drunks’: 
 
Extract 5: TOC5
Ste: (certainly) there’s a lot’a’lads guh:’in the n↑ight time (0.1) 
 have a session of drink, they think it’s a nice 
1 
quiet place, 
 nice 
2 
scenery, ◦y’know◦ they just ab↑use it. 3 
 
 
Steve characterises the ‘drunks’ as people who ‘abuse’ the park, which is constructed 
as a ‘nice quiet place’; this construction, together with the combination of intonation 
and emphasise on ‘abuse’, conveys something hearable as contempt or disgust for this 
group. Very shortly after this, Wayne first introduces and then describes the fire 
jugglers: 
 
Extract 6: TOC5
Way:  they’re usually up on the bank. 13 
14 
15 
16 
 (0.5) 
  yeah¿  
 
Way:  sometimes they go in the middle of the field=depends how 
(0.2) 
17 
18 
19 
busy 
 it is.   
 
Way: and they ↑
(0.6) 
20 
21 
22 
are fant↑astic,  
 (0.4) 
?  : mm? 
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Way: >yeah.< 23 
24  
Way:  i’ve see:n uh:m: (0.8) ↑↑
(0.3) 
25 
26 
27 
knights¿ (0.7) >in armour<  
 (0.2)  
 
Way: [yeah uh 
[((various ‘amazed’ sounds)) 
28 
42 
mock (.) fighting,= 
 
 
As Wayne’s description develops over numerous turns it is laden with significant 
pauses, perhaps as he checks for ‘permission’ to continue from other group members. 
On line 20 the pattern of emphases and intonations on ‘fantastic’ hearably enacts the 
wonder it attempts to describe, and then sparks a further ‘amazing’ reminiscence of 
seeing ‘knights in armour’ on the park. The moral dimension of his affection or 
enthusiasm for this group then becomes explicit some lines later when they are 
explicitly contrasted with the ‘drunks’: 
 
Extract 7: TOC5
Way: i- i- i- it’s really (.) i mean i’ve watched, cos I work on 
 there, I watch it at night time and I think it’s ↓fant↑astic. 43 
44  (0.4) 
45 
46 
47 
   but then >on the other side< you get the drunks that come down 
 an’  
Bar: (thats right) 
Way: >R↑UIn it ↓All.< °you know whar i mean° 48 
 
The emphases and intonations of Wayne’s ‘fantastic’ on line 43 resemble the earlier 
occurrence of the word and gain further relevance because of the lengthy pause 
afterward, immediately following which the contrast with ‘drunks’ appears. Now the 
emotion is carried mainly in the volume and pitch shifts on ‘ruin it all’; this 
construction, similar to Steve’s construction of ‘abuse’, enacts a disapproving and 
perhaps disgusted emotional tone, contrasting sharply with the admiration and 
enthusiasm preceding it. Thus in this extract much of the moral dimension is carried 
by contrasting emotions of wonder/amazement and disgust/contempt, but as the next 
extract shows this is not always the case: 
 
Extract 8: TOC6
Cra:            [i mean] i- i know of- of people who have gone to 
 the students next door: and all they’ve got is a mouth
1 
ful, of 
 a↓
2 
buse.  3 
4  ((various murmuring))  
Cra: we live here, we ↑pay to live here. 5 
6  (0.3) 
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Cra:  what they don’t seem to realise is you’re only here for nine 
 months of the 
7 
year, (0.3) ↑some of ↓us (.) live he:re, (.) all 
 year round. its our own 
8 
pr↑opertie[s and ↓things.]  9 
10 
11 
Bar:                                   [that’s right, ] 
?  : ↓mm:: 
Cra: And to G↑et,(0.2) the occ↓asional student¿ (.) cause one year 
 you might get a great group of 
12 
students ↓in, (.) >and have no 
 problems whatso
13 
ever.<  14 
15  
Cra:  the next year you ↑Hav- y’ave a 
(0.1) 
16 
17 
18 
housef↓ul, (0.4)and ↓all of em 
 are noisy ↑students  
 (0.4) 
 and it’s ↓not fa:ir, (0.4) on the general, (0.5) >resident 
 popul
19 
ation,<  (0.4) when you ↑do get a ↓bad ↓house (with)  
students.  
20 
21  
Leo: (well that) is true. 22 
 
 
Craig refers to the transient nature of students and contrasts this to residents, including 
himself (“some of us” line 8), who are long-term residents or owners (line 9). 
Similarly on lines 12-14 and 16-17 he contrasts a “great” group of students, who do 
not pose problems, with a ‘houseful’ who are ‘noisy’: here, the term ‘houseful’ itself 
invokes an image of chaos, disorder, uncountable numbers. This distinction 
subsequently helps produce another, between the ‘general resident population’ and a 
generic ‘bad’ house of students (lines 19-21). These nested contrasts constitute 
‘residents’ as simply ‘there’ and students as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and their 
contribution to a moral case becomes explicit as the notion of fairness is introduced. 
Notably, although Craig stresses some words and phonemes to emphasise contrasting 
aspects of students behaviour, his delivery is hearably ‘matter-of-fact’ and 
emotionally neutral. His turns follow the heated discussion analysed in extract 3, 
where frustration and anger were enacted in relation to student behaviour, and in this 
context his carefully neutral delivery provides ‘fairness’ or ‘balance’. However, as 
Brennan (2004) observes, emotional neutrality is not the same thing as indifference; 
the measured emphases and intonations in Craig’s talk enact its sensitivity to the 
affective context into which it fell, rendering it as carefully neutral within, yet entirely 
entirely sensitive to, the heated context preceding his turn. 
 
In extract 9 we see two contrasts being simultaneously worked up as part of an 
orientation to some kind of hierarchical arrangement of ‘problem’ situations and 
behaviours: 
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Extract 9: TOC6
Cra: it’s the dea- we- if y- if you live where the dealers are. 
 like for instance 
1 
back of (.) Linbrakes bookies up (          ) 
 Rufford road, 
2 
3 
4  (0.3) 
Cra:  if you’re in an area like that, you’re gettin‘em come to 
 you-°on° (.) y
5 
our doorstep.  that’s when it’s more: (.) in 
 your face.=  
6 
7 
8 Jun: =°mmm°= 
Cra: =the vast majority of Rufford and Hobson Green, if you 
 haven’t got a dealer uh (.) camped out on yer- on yer 
 
9 
10 
corner, (.) >it i-, probably isn’t a problem. 11 
12 
13 
? :  °mmm° 
 
Cra: but if you ↑
(0.3) 
14 happen to be in the (.) one of the spots  
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
 [where there is: a ↓local ↓dealer,  ] 
 [((murmuring from various speakers))] 
Leo:  °mmm° 
Cra:  Th↑en:=  
?  :   =°mm°  
Cra: you ↑Have got a problem. 20 
21 
22 
 
?  : ( [    -)] 
(.)  
Cra:   [cause ]e’s coming into the area. 23 
24 
25 
26 
 
((
 
13 turns omitted – about who was surveyed )) 
Ste: (beginning like) depends what sort of drugs th’sellin aswell. 
 if you’ve got your local (.) dealers selling yer like 
 (the weed an) stuff like, it’s not  >a lo’ a’trouble< 
27 
28 
bu:t (.) 
 specially these days  you’ve got (em) selling heroin and 
29 
30 
31 
32 
 crack cocaine
Mik: mmm[m 
Ste:    [and ↑that’s (.) that’s a  big  ↓problem, there’s a lot 
 of crime related to th
33 
em drugs as well, 34 
Participants are discussing the extent to which drug-dealing is a problem, and single 
out a particular area. At line 5 Craig describes the immediacy of the problem in terms 
of drug-dealers coming on “your doorstep” and being “in your face”; in line 10 he 
contrasts this scenario with one where you haven’t got a dealer “camped out on your 
corner”.  These are all extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) that emphasise 
the proximity of the problem to some people and highlight its intrusiveness, being on 
your doorstep and in your face and on your ‘(yer’) corner. Notably, however, drug-
dealing per se is not constructed as problematic; the extent to which it is problematic 
is dependent upon a hierarchy of proximity and place. Then, at line 27 Steve alludes 
to a further hierarchy which problematises some drugs in comparison to others: ‘weed 
an stuff’ are indexed as less troublesome than heroin and crack cocaine.  On lines 30-
31 he further develops this construction, suggesting that the sale of the latter two has 
an element of crime attached to them. Although all recreational drug-dealing is illegal 
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and therefore, by definition, criminal, a hierarchy is constructed here that separates 
the dealing of ‘weed an stuff’ from the dealing of other drugs. In this extract, then, 
hierachical levels of ‘problem’ get constructed with relation to both place and ‘crime’; 
throughout, the many emphases and shifting intonations endow these hierarchies with 
some affective force. Notably, despite the affects enacted, no-one questions these 
hierarchical constructions, suggesting that they accord with local shared knowledge 
and with the group’s normative understandings of what might be construed 
‘troublesome’ and ‘less troublesome’ drugs. 
 
Invoking Others 
Finally, moral judgements were also worked up by invoking both specific groups and 
specific places associated with their activities. Frequently, these were groups who 
might be widely considered ‘vulnerable’, such as children and people with 
disabilities: consequently, some of the moral work was conducted pre-emptively, 
since their mere invocation of these categories of people already carries a normative 
range of expectations and responsibilities that would not necessarily attach to others. 
In extract 10, for example, both children and people with disabilities get recruited as 
part of a moral case against local builders who leave skips and bags of rubble in such 
a way that they block pavements: 
 
Extract 10: TOC 9
Way:    [the]y should do the same thing with them bags. 1 
2  (0.2)  
Cra: E[X↑a:ctly:,            ] 3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Way:  [°>they really should<°]= 
? : =mmn=  
Way:  =°they°>reall[y should<  
Cra:              [i sa:y:,  
 (0.7) 
Cra: ↑skips are covered under legislation ↓aren’t ↓they, 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
 (0.1)   
 Yeah, actual government legi[slation whe]re  
Jun?:                             [mm::   mm::] 
 (0.3) 
Cra: BUilder’s Bags Aren’t:,  14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
 
Cra: but if they were done the same way, (0.3) it >would have to 
 be national legislation,< [this is some 
(0.4) 
Jun?:                           [mm::::  
Way: they take up half°a° pavement.  
Jun: yeah. 
 
Way: people wi’ >you know< 
(0.2)  
wheelchairs, people in >pushchairs<, 
 (0.1) 
22 
you’ve gorra ↓double ↓buggy you’ve got cross the ↓road.   23 
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Jun: yea:h. 24 
25  
Way: you [
(0.2)  
26 
1 
2 
rea:lly ‘ave, 
 
Although legality is discussed, the moral case is worked up primarily in terms of 
inconvenience to pavement users, specifically (lines 22-23) wheelchair users and 
those with pushchairs: people with a disability, and children. Whilst both these groups 
could be considered to have some additional vulnerability, the moral implication is 
nevertheless strengthened by a claimed imperative (that they have “got” to cross the 
road when builders’ bags block pavements), and further reinforced by a downwardly 
intoned, heavily emphasised delivery, which enacts a kind of mild ‘outrage’ with a 
situation where, in particular, people with double buggies are forced to cross the road.  
The moral case, then, is that leaving builders bags on the pavement removes choice, 
produces inconvenience and perhaps even (by needlessly crossing the road) exposes 
vulnerable people to danger. Extract 11 also sees the participants invoking children, as 
part of a moral case against an ongoing problem of anti-social noise: 
 
Extract 11: WOC11
PR : (thats) ((name)) or ((name)) 
 
PR :  i’ll find out 
(0.3) 
3 
4 
who:°s° 
 
May: but 
(0.2) 
5 
6 
7 
something’s got to be done, becau:se (.) same as i say. °.hh°
 (1.2) 
Bar:  (   [) 
May:     [WHen You’ve got to Go OU:t,  8 
9  (0.6) 
May: y’know you’ve GOtta go ↑OUt every ↓da[y  10 
11 
12 
Bar:                                      [°i [know] yeah° 
        [>to get<]  
May: aw↓a:y: from the ↓noi::se. 13 
14  (0.4) 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
 and when you’ve got >L[ittl’↓u]ns,< 
Bar:        [°mmn:° ] 
 mmn: 
 (0.8)  
May:  y’ know. >you don’t wanna be stuck in the‘ouse< 
 
Bar:  [mm. (.)  mm. (.)  mm:.  ]  
[with screaming kids an::]  
22  an:: (.) ↑THAT LOt going on outs#ide#. 
The group have previously discussed this problem at length, and at line 5 May begins 
building an argument for why it has to be resolved. In lines 8 and 10 she talks of when 
people have “got” to go out, “every” day, to escape the noise. Her talk is animated 
throughout, with multiple emphases and rapid shifts in tone and volume. At line 15 
she begins spelling out the impact on children. The endearing construction 
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“L[ittl’↓u]ns” serves to heighten the difference between the unbearable loud noise on 
the one hand and the potential vulnerability of young children on the other, although 
she then suggests that the children might be “screaming kids” and that the problem 
noise would compound the pressure on whoever is with them. May’s delivery is 
affectively charged, notably the loudness with which she delivers lines 8, 10 and 22 
and the rising and falling intonation throughout lines 10, 13 and 22, features that 
hearably enact her ‘frustration’. Together, both the content of her talk and its emotive 
delivery build the moral case that this problem should not have to be tolerated. 
 
Finally, children are again invoked in extract 12, this time with respect to the issue of 
dog-fouling near to a school: 
 
Extract 12: TOC9
Mik:   because around there is the community school.   1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
Mik: ((name1)) Street goes down one side and ((name2))Street goes 
 around the back of it.  
(0.5) 
 
Mik: and [we really 
(0.3) 
6 
7 
don’t wanna see dog fouling.  
          [((someone clearing throat)) 
Mik: °IT’s AR↑OUND K↑I:DS¿°  8 
9 
10 
11 
Jun: mm:, 
Mik: and it’s the °W↑↑ORST ↑AREA°.= 
Jun: =mm.= 
Mik: =wors- worst streets in the whole area  12 
13  (0.3) 
14 
15 
 that’s >come out of our–< ou- 
Jun:      [mm:, 
[>out of our<  
Mik: project >that we did<. >it’s terrible.<   16 
Jun: perhaps >somebody doesn’t like< children. 17 
 
In this extract, the invocation of children (‘kids’) on line 8 is notable for its highly 
emotive delivery. The raised volume, emphasis on ‘around’ and pitch shifts within the 
turn render it hearable as enacting incredulity and indignation that anyone might allow 
their dogs to foul the pavement near the school. This is reinforced on line 10 with a 
similarly charged extreme case (‘the worst area’), and again on line 12 with a more 
measured delivery that nevertheless repeats the previous extreme case. Across these 
turns, Mike delivers a moral judgement both with the invocation of children and with 
the emotionally-charged way in which the problem is described. 
 
Discussion 
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 Our analysis has revealed aspects of the situated morality of residents of an inner-city 
area with high rates of crime and ASB, and shown how their moral reasoning and 
judging enrols various kinds of emotional enactments and affective stances. As 
psychologists, we can speak only tentatively about the implications of this work for 
colleagues in criminology, and we remain aware that our study and data are 
necessarily limited in both their scope and generality. There are nevertheless some 
features and implications of the analysis that we would like to draw out more 
explicitly in this closing section of the paper. 
 
First, we wish to emphasise that, throughout our data, participant’s constructions of 
crime and ASB were not separate either from their moral reasoning or their emotional 
enactments: all were thoroughly bound together. As participants jointly defined 
problems of crime and ASB, they simultaneously worked up moral arguments that 
made the incidents they discussed count as crime and ASB, and these arguments 
typically recruited emotional enactments and marshalled degrees of affective force. 
Rather than first making a definition and then allowing their reasoning to proceed 
from it, participants’ definitions and reasoning were nested together; simultaneously, 
both were bound up with, carried by, and in part enacted through, interwoven and 
concurrent affective exchanges. Illustrating the contention that an emotional point of 
view might enrich criminology (De Haan & Loader, 2002), our data demonstrate that 
the lay norms of everyday social action, by which crime and ASB are in practice 
identified, already include marked affective components. Their shared assertion and 
mutual accomplishment was consistently conducted, in part, through a variety of 
reciprocal, relationally meaningful, affective flows and stances; and to the extent that 
this is a general phenomenon, it suggests that criminology could legitimately extend 
its engagement with emotion and consider the affective dimensions of other topics. 
This strategy might, for example, illuminate definitional problems such as those 
associated with the plural, differential and contextually nuanced character of ASB 
(Millie, 2008). It might also illuminate aspects of the fear of crime paradigm, where it 
is increasingly clear that fear of crime has historically been overstated , that crime 
calls out other emotions as well as fear (Phillips & Smith, 2003), and that these 
emotional responses are nuanced according to the particulars of place and experience 
(Pain, 2000; Walklate & Mythen, 2008). Our findings further emphasise this 
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particularity and variability, and reinforce the possible value of calls to relate work in 
this paradigm to studies of ‘everyday’ emotion (e.g. Jackson, 2004). 
 
Second, it is notable how thoroughly the morality of our participants is localised, and 
how it both accords with, and diverges from, the moralities encoded in law and 
associated with government policies. Millie (2009) observes that definitions of ASB 
are temporal, situational and aesthetic, and our data clearly show such variation. 
Commentators on government policy regarding respect and ASB have noted that 
respect is disproportionally expected from the already marginalised: notably, our 
participants demand ‘respect’ from both large and small businesses (ASDA, ‘LOT’, 
local builders) as well as from the young people (noisy students, people who cycle 
carelessly) whom this policy most typically targets. Similarly, our participants’ 
morality sometimes mirrors, and sometimes bypasses, legal codes and statutes. 
Although dealing in all three drugs is illegal, our participants distinguish between 
dealers of cannabis, who are constructed as relatively harmless, and dealers of heroin 
and cocaine. All cycling on the pavement is illegal, but nevertheless gets morally 
differentiated quite sharply according to the level of care with which it is conducted; 
conversely, the dumping of builder’s rubble on the pavement is primarily discussed in 
moral terms despite its illegality being established. Karstedt & Farrall’s (2006) 
analysis of everyday crime noted that many people are selective about which laws to 
comply with, and linked this selectivity to a form of anomie associated with markets 
and ‘moral economies’; our findings may enrich this analysis by showing how these 
moral configurations are thoroughly localised, and demonstrating that the corrosion of 
the market is not all-pervasive. Rather than an absence of morality, our participants’ 
selective regard for the law instantiated a local, shared morality which sometimes 
took precedence. Whilst it might be tempting (especially considering its affective 
components) to dismiss this local moral reasoning as flawed and ‘irrational; we 
suggest that it is more fruitful to see it as sophisticated and differentiated according to 
the concrete particulars of the participants’ social and material situation, and perhaps 
illustrative of the ways in which everyday crime, ASB and incivility are in actual 
practice frequently demarcated. Some criminologists (e.g. De Haan & Loader, 2002, 
Ferrell 2003, Katz 1998) have argued for an understanding of the emotional, sensuous 
dimensions of criminal activity; our analysis suggests that a similarly affective 
understanding of its recognition and identification by others would also be valuable. 
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 Yar (2009) observes that criminology, like many other disciplines, has historically 
treated emotion by polarising it against rationality. Whereas emotions were integral to 
the classic sociologies of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, the functionalism and 
scientism that dominated sociology in the last century have yielded a criminology 
largely predicated upon narrow, calculative and utilitarian models of social action. In 
contrast, Yar argues for a criminology that does not separate reason from affect, a 
criminology that treats emotions as both embodied appraisals and meaningful social 
action, and which recognises how choices are informed by both ‘emotional reasons’ 
and ‘reasonable emotions’. In our study moral reasoning was already partially 
affective, flexibly and consistently bound up with a range of emotional stances and 
displays; it both provides support for Yar’s contention, and offers one possible 
methodology by which it might be furthered. 
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